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Of heaven, not me, make an experiment.
I am not an impostor that proclaim
Myself against the level of mine aim;
But know I think and think I know most sure
My art is not past power nor you past cure.
— Helena (All’s Well That Ends Well, 2.1.763–67)
Abstract: Professional philosophers say it’s obvious that a Gettier 
subject does not know. But experimental philosophers and psycho­
logists have argued that laypeople and non­Westerners view Gettier 
subjects  very  differently,  based  on  experiments  where  laypeople 
tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects. I argue that when ef­
fectively  probed,  laypeople  and  non­Westerners  unambiguously 
agree that Gettier subjects do not know.
1. Introduction
A Gettier case features a protagonist who has a justified true belief, 
but who, according to prevailing philosophical wisdom, obviously 
lacks knowledge (Gettier 1963). Among professional philosophers, 
* This is  the penultimate version of a paper forthcoming in  Philosophers’  
Imprint. Please cite the final, published version if possible. 
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there is a virtual consensus that a Gettiered subject does not know.1 
Call this the Gettier intuition.
Experimental philosophers and psychologists have recently ar­
gued that  laypeople  don’t  share  the  Gettier  intuition.  When sur­
veyed, laypeople reveal a tendency to ascribe knowledge to Gettier 
subjects.  Studies  have been reported on laypeople  from Western 
and non­Western cultures  (Starmans  and Friedman 2012,  Wein­
berg, Nichols and Stich 2001, Cullen 2010).
If  (a) philosophers and laypeople are talking about the same 
thing when they speak of ‘knowledge’, and (b) both groups compet­
ently assess Gettier cases, and (c) both frankly report their judg­
ments,  then  the  two  groups  will  respond  similarly  when  asked 
whether the Gettier subject knows. Thus, if the two groups respond 
differently, then either (a), (b) or (c) is false. And the experimental­
ists have provided evidence that the groups do respond differently. 
So at least one of (a), (b) or (c) is probably false. In light of the ex­
perimental findings, all three options have been explored.
Some accept that philosophers and laypeople are talking past 
one another. It’s a mere verbal disagreement (as suggested by Sosa 
2007, 2009). Others accept that one of the two groups isn’t compet­
ently assessing the cases, and since philosophers are trained experts 
at assessing thought experiments, whereas laypeople are amateurs, 
the laypeople are probably at fault (Ludwig 2007, Williamson 2007, 
2011). Philosophical training makes one better at noticing import­
1 Sartwell 1991, Turri 2012a, and Hetherington forthcoming dissent. For a 
review of  some recent  attempts  to  solve  the  Gettier  problem,  see  Turri 
2012b.
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ant but subtle details, which explains the difference in performance. 
Others accept that one of the groups isn’t frankly reporting their 
judgment about the cases.2 Since philosophers ostensibly set aside 
purely practical concerns and study these cases in order to reach the 
truth about some important question,  whereas laypeople’s  verbal 
performances remain sensitive to a broader range of practical con­
cerns, it’s more likely that laypeople aren’t frankly reporting their 
judgment.
This paper provides resources that strengthen the expertise re­
sponse to the experimental results: laypeople who answer that the 
Gettier subject knows aren’t competently enough assessing the case. 
Proponents of the expertise response incur an empirical commit­
ment. If the expertise response is correct, then philosophers notice 
and assign proper weight to features of the cases that untutored 
laypeople overlook. Accordingly, we would expect that if we effect­
ively guide participants to notice and assign proper weight to those 
same  features,  then  they  will  respond  similarly  to  philosophers. 
That is, they will say that the Gettier subject doesn’t know.
To that end, I propose a simple and natural technique for ef­
fectively guiding participants to competently assess Gettier cases, 
and I report a series of experiments that demonstrate its effective­
ness. Section 2 introduces the technique. Section 3 discusses some 
previous experimental results which don’t use the technique. Sec­
tions  4–9 report  new experimental  findings  gained  by  using  the 
technique. Section 10 briefly concludes the discussion.
2 I’m exploring this possibility in ongoing work.
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2. Conspicuous tripartite structure
One  very  effective  way  to  think  about  Gettier  cases  is  in  three 
stages. Start with a belief that is well enough justified to satisfy the 
justification condition on knowledge.  All  seems well.  Then intro­
duce an element of bad luck that would normally prevent the justi­
fied belief from being true. All seems ill. Then introduce a conspicu­
ously distinct element of good luck that makes the belief true any­
way (Zagzebski 1996). But not all is made well again. This is how I 
find myself thinking about Gettier cases (see Turri 2011), and it has 
proven  very  effective  in  discussing  matters  with  undergraduates 
and laypeople more generally. In my experience, when the case is 
dramatized this way, the Gettier intuition is powerful and widely 
shared.
But this is mere anecdote. What will happen if we guide parti­
cipants to think of the case this way too, dramatizing the conspicu­
ously distinct elements of luck via a tripartite structure? One way to 
do this is to physically present the story in three distinct stages, on 
separate pages or screens, and ask participants to keep track of the 
(apparent) truth of the target proposition in light of new informa­
tion at each stage. I predict that when probed this way, participants 
will not ascribe knowledge to the Gettier subject.
No previous experimental work on Gettier cases adopts this ap­
proach. In a word, and vividly: where my predecessors used clubs, I 
recommend a trident. The next section reviews two previous studies 
to demonstrate how my proposed technique differs.
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3. Two previous studies
The most recent empirical challenge to the Gettier intuition comes 
from Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman (2012). In a series of 
impressive experiments, they observed that laypeople consistently 
ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects  at  rates exceeding chance.3 
Here is one of their cases.
Katie is in her locked apartment writing a letter. She puts the 
letter and her blue Bic pen down on her coffee table. Then 
she  goes  into  the  bathroom  to  take  a  shower.  As  Katie’s 
shower  begins,  two  burglars  silently  break  into  the  apart­
ment. One burglar takes Katie’s blue Bic pen from the table. 
But  the  other  burglar  absentmindedly  leaves  his  own 
identical blue Bic pen on the coffee table. Then the burglars 
leave. Katie is still in the shower and did not hear anything.
This is clearly a Gettier case. But it is not presented in stages, and 
the respective sources of bad and good luck are not conspicuously 
distinct. When asked whether Katie ‘really knows’ or ‘only thinks’ 
that there is a pen on the table, participants selected ‘really knows’ 
at rates exceeding chance (69%). Participants also reported being 
highly confident in their judgment. Rates of knowledge attribution 
3 Jackson (2011: 469) identifies several responses to surveys suggesting that 
the folk think that Gettier subjects know. The first response is to ‘insist that 
the surveys . . . are defective,’ on the grounds that they ‘violate one or an­
other principle of good social science polling, and maybe use Gettier cases 
that aren’t among those found most compelling by analytic philosophers.’ 
But this description certainly doesn’t  apply to Starmans and Friedman’s 
work, which displays a level of methodological rigor typical of the best ex­
perimental social science and features paradigmatic Gettier cases.
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and reported confidence didn’t  differ  significantly between parti­
cipants who read Gettier cases and participants who read non­Get­
tier control cases.
Participants answered a series of comprehension questions be­
fore answering the key test question about whether the Gettier sub­
ject  knows.  This  eliminated  data  from  participants  who  weren’t 
reading  the  story  carefully.  Moreover,  Starmans  and  Friedman 
claim, the questioning encouraged participants ‘to closely approx­
imate the logical steps that philosophers have deemed relevant for 
the attribution of knowledge’; it ‘forced’ them to ‘reason through the 
relevant  factors’  of  the  case.  In  particular,  the  questions  ‘high­
lighted’ the typical ‘disconnect’ between justification and truth, and 
the  typical  ‘luck element’  distinctive of  Gettier  cases  (2012:  5–6, 
10). However, Starmans and Friedman note, this ‘extra guidance’ 
didn’t prevent laypeople from mostly attributing knowledge (2012: 
6).4 Nevertheless, they accept that it’s important to effectively guide 
participants to think through the relevant details.
I replicated Starmans and Friedman’s findings from this study. 
Participants (N = 28)5 were tested using Starmans and Friedman’s 
4 Starmans and Friedman don’t conclude that the folk concept of knowledge 
is  justified  true  belief.  For  they also  observed  that  the  folk  declined to 
ascribe knowledge when the subject’s evidence was merely ‘apparent’, even 
when the belief was true and justified. Apparent evidence is ‘evidence that 
appears to be informative about reality, but is not really’ (2012: 9). By con­
trast, ‘authentic evidence’ is, roughly, evidence that makes the belief true 
when based on it.
5 Thirteen female, aged 18–63,  M  = 32.5,  SD  = 10.47. As with the experi­
ments reported below, participants were recruited using Amazon Mechan­
ical Turk and compensated $.30 for approximately 2–3 minutes of their 
time. Ninety­six percent reported English as their native language. They 
7  |  Putting Gettier to the test
original  materials.  A  majority  (57%)  answered  that  Katie  ‘really 
knows’ that there is a pen on the coffee table. This does not differ 
significantly from the original study’s results (69%, binomial,  p  = 
0.25),6 though neither does it differ significantly from what would 
be expected by chance (binomial,  p  =  0.572).  This pattern of re­
sponse clearly  differs  from  the  alleged  philosophical  consensus. 
Starmans and Friedman also report results from a weighted know­
ledge ascription, which is the product of the answer to the dicho­
tomous knowledge question (really knows = 1; only thinks = ­1) and 
the reported confidence (1–10, low to high). Scores for this measure 
could range from ­10 (fully confident knowledge denial) to 10 (fully 
confident knowledge ascription). Starmans and Friedman observed 
a  mean  weighted  knowledge  ascription  that  exceeded  chance  in 
Katie’s case (M  = 3.92,  SD  = 8.21).  I  observed a mean weighted 
knowledge ascription that did not  differ  significantly either from 
their results (M = 1.5,  SD = 9.31,  t(27) = ­1.375, p = 0.18) or from 
chance (t(27) = 0.852, p = 0.401). I conducted two follow­up stud­
ies and continued to observe the same basic pattern,  further rein­
forcing Starmans and Friedman’s findings.7
filled out a brief demographic survey after testing. I excluded data from two  
participants  who  failed  comprehension  questions.  Including  data  from 
these participants doesn’t  significantly affect  the results  reported below. 
Participants were not allowed to re­take any survey, and participants who 
had taken previous similar surveys were excluded by their AMT Worker ID. 
Except for the experiment discussed in section 7, all participants were loc­
ated throughout the United States.
6 All tests are two­tailed, unless otherwise noted.
7 Following up on a couple suggestions from Frank Jackson (p.c.), I ran two 
slightly modified surveys involving Katie’s case. In the one version (N=29), 
time­indexing was added to the test question itself, to make sure that parti­
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In an older influential study, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nich­
ols, and Stephen Stich (2001) presented results from a survey con­
ducted on undergraduates at Rutgers. Their sample population in­
cluded participants of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent. 
For purposes of analysis, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich treated these 
participants as a single group that could tell  us something about 
‘the epistemic intuitions of people from the Indian sub­continent 
(hereafter SCs)’ (2001: 443). Weinberg, Nichols and Stich had par­
ticipants (N=23) read a typical Gettier case.
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. 
Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is 
not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, 
and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pon­
tiac,  which is  a  different  kind  of  American  car.  Does  Bob 
really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only 
believe it?
The case was presented all at once, not in stages. Weinberg, Nichols 
and Stich don’t report asking any comprehension questions. Sixty­
cipants were ascribing knowledge at the relevant part of the story: as Katie 
is finishing up her shower, rather than, say, after she walks back out into 
the living room. Sixty­five percent of participants in this condition ascribed 
knowledge. In the other version (N = 22), the burglar’s blue Bic pen was 
not described as ‘identical’ to Katie’s. Forty­one percent of participants in 
this condition ascribed knowledge. Overall, rates of knowledge ascription 
didn’t differ significantly across the three versions. Overall for the replica­
tion and the two minor variations (N = 79), 56% of participants ascribed 
knowledge. And although this differs significantly from 69% (binomial, p = 
0.018),  it doesn’t differ significantly from chance (binomial,  p  =  0.368). 
What seems most important in all of this is that there’s no sign here that  
the folk think it’s obvious that the Gettier subject doesn’t know.
9  |  Putting Gettier to the test
one percent of their participants said that the Gettier subject ‘really 
knows’. (I return to this experiment in Section 7.)
4. A staged encounter
This section reports an experiment that illustrates my alternative 
tripartite approach to Gettier surveys.
4.1. Method
Participants (N = 52)8 were randomly assigned to one of two condi­
tions: Control and Authentic Gettier.9 All participants read a story 
8 Eighteen female, aged 18–59, M = 27.58, SD = 8.78. One­hundred percent 
reported English as their native language. I excluded data from eight parti­
cipants who failed comprehension questions.
9 ‘Authentic Gettier’ because it features authentic evidence, in Starmans and 
Friedman’s sense of that term (see n. 4 above). Starmans and Friedman ob­
served that participants were much more likely to ascribe knowledge in 
Gettier cases involving authentic evidence than in Gettier cases involving 
apparent evidence. The cases used for SC Tripartite and Zebra feature ap­
parent evidence. Some of the results reported below further support  Star­
mans and Friedman’s hypothesis; see n. 30.
For the record,  I  think that  Starmans and Friedman are  right  that 
laypeople tend to view the cases as different, with more ascribing knowl­
edge when the evidence is authentic.  I take their findings to establish the 
following: in an identifiable (even if somewhat fuzzy) range of cases where 
the protagonist perceptually detects the truth and justifiably continues to 
believe that truth over a short period of time, the default position for a lot 
of people – perhaps a small majority – seems to be that the protagonist 
continues to know, whether or not she’s Gettiered. Waxing figuratively for 
just a moment, we might put the point this way: at least in the short term,  
the epistemic inertia of initially successful perception can, to some extent, 
inhibit Gettierization from having the expected effect on lay judgment.  A 
related insight finds expression in the professional literature, where many 
philosophers claim that fake­barn cases,  which involve successful percep­
tion, are cases of knowledge and differ importantly from standard Gettier 
cases (see Turri 2012a for discussion and references).
In a forthcoming paper accepted after this paper was accepted for pub­
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in three stages. The  first and  third stages were the same in both 
conditions; but the critical second stage differed. Here is the story, 
with the different second stages clearly marked.
Stage One: Robert recently made a purchase for a rare 1804 
US silver dollar. He keeps the coin on display over the fire­
place in his library. This evening Robert is having his neigh­
bors over for dinner. He puts the coin in its display over the 
fireplace, shuts the library doors behind him, and hurries to 
greet his guests, who just arrived. He greets them and says, 
“Guess what? There is an 1804 US silver dollar in my lib­
rary.”
Stage Two – Authentic Gettier: When Robert shut the lib­
rary doors, a coin thief silently entered through the library 
window, stole Robert's 1804 US silver dollar, and quickly es­
caped.  Robert  had  only  been  out  of  the  library  for  a  few 
seconds  and did  not  hear  anything.  The  coin  was  already 
gone by the  time Robert  greets  his  guests  and tells  them, 
“There is an 1804 US silver dollar in my library.”
Stage Two – Control: When Robert shut the library doors, 
the vibrations from the door shutting caused the silver dollar 
to fall from its display and land on the rug near the fireplace. 
lication, Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan and Raymond Mar observed dif­
ferent results  for cases that they claim are essentially similar to Starmans 
and Friedman’s. (The relevant experimental stimuli weren’t publicly avail­
able as of this writing.) But Nagel et al. collected and analyzed responses 
very differently from how Starmans and Friedman did, so a direct compari­
son of the disparate results is fraught.
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Robert had only been out of the library for a few seconds and 
did not hear anything. The coin had already fallen onto the 
library floor by the time Robert greets his guests and tells 
them, “There is an 1804 US silver dollar in my library.”
Stage Three: Robert's house is a very old mansion. Back in 
the early 1800s, when the house was originally built, one of 
the  carpenters accidentally,  and without noticing,  dropped 
an 1804 US silver dollar into the mortar mix used to make 
the fireplace. This lost silver dollar is still in the fireplace in 
the library. But no one has seen it for hundreds of years, and 
no one will ever see it again. It will remain hidden in Robert's 
library.
Each stage appeared on a different screen.10 Participants in each 
condition were asked one comprehension question at each stage. It 
was always the same comprehension question (options in brackets):
When Robert greets his guests,  is  there an 1804 US silver 
dollar in his library? [Yes/No]11
10 NB: I don’t claim that physically breaking up the story on separate pages or 
screens is  necessary to effectively guide participants. I claim only that it 
will be, for the most part, sufficient. Effective tri­partitioning might be ac­
complished all at once. I am pursuing this possibility in ongoing work, but 
results reported in section 9 — viz. the rate of knowledge ascription in 1­
Gettier compared to 3­Gettier — suggest that it will be very difficult.
11 Options were rotated randomly for all questions in all experiments repor­
ted here, except for confidence measures, which were always ordered 1–10 
(‘not at all confident’ to ‘completely confident’). At the end of the second 
stage in the Authentic Gettier condition, participants who answered ‘no’ to 
the comprehension question passed. Even though this turns out to be false 
in the story, participants paying close attention will be led to this reason­
able but false belief about the story at this juncture.
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After the story was complete, participants were then asked the test 
question:
When Robert greets his guests, he _______ that there is an 
1804 US silver dollar in his library. [really knows/only thinks 
he knows]
Participants were then asked to report how confident they were in 
their answer to the test question (1–10, low to high).
The motivation for  setting the  case  up this  way is  simple:  it 
dramatizes the tripartite structure of Gettier cases, guiding parti­
cipants to notice the intersection of evidence, truth and luck, and 
highlighting that the bad luck’s source differs conspicuously from 
the good luck’s source. This is accomplished by explicitly dividing 
the story into three stages and asking participants to keep track of 
the truth of the key proposition in light of new information.
4.2.Results and discussion
I made four predictions about the results. First, there would be an 
effect of condition. Second, participants in Control would say that 
Robert ‘really knows’ at rates exceeding chance. Third, participants 
in Authentic Gettier would strongly tend to say that Robert ‘only 
thinks he knows’. Fourth, there would be no effect of condition on 
reported confidence.
All four predictions were correct. There was a dramatic effect of 
condition on the dichotomous test question (Fisher’s exact test, p < 
0.001,  one­tailed);12 participants  in  Control  overwhelmingly  said 
12 I  use  one­tailed  tests  here  because the relevant  predictions  were direc­
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that Robert ‘really knows’ (84%, binomial,  p  = 0.002, one­tailed); 
participants in Authentic Gettier overwhelmingly said that Robert 
‘only thinks he knows’ (89%, binomial,  p < 0.001, one­tailed); and 
there was no effect of condition on reported confidence (χ2(6)  = 
7.181, p = 0.304).13 (See Figure 1.)
Results from the weighted knowledge ascription tell a similar 
story (Figure 1).14 A one­way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed 
a dramatic effect of condition (M = 6.76/­6.44, F(1,50) = 61.66, p < 
0.001);  weighted  knowledge  attribution  in  Control  far  exceeded 
what could be expected by chance (t(24) = 5.348,  p < 0.001); and 
weighted knowledge denial in Authentic Gettier far exceeded what 
could be expected by chance (t(26) = ­5.767, p < 0.001). These are 
exactly the results we would expect if the tripartite procedure effect­
ively guides participants to assess Gettier cases.
The tripartite structure itself doesn’t lead participants to deny 
knowledge, or else they would do so in the Control condition too. 
The occurrence of unexpected events related to the truth of the be­
lief in question — such as the coin falling due to vibrations from 
slamming doors, or a long­lost rare coin of precisely the same sort 
being hidden in the fireplace — doesn’t lead participants to deny 
tional. However, the results are still significant even when using two­tailed 
tests.
13 M = 8.92/8.44, SD = 2.16/1.67. There was no effect of condition on confid­
ence in the other experiments reported either.
14 Following Starmans and Friedman (2012), I define a weighted knowledge 
ascription  as  the  product  of  the  answer  to  the  dichotomous  knowledge 
question (really knows = 1; only thinks he knows = ­1) and the reported 
confidence (1–10, low to high). Scores for this measure could range from 
­10  (fully  confident  knowledge  denial)  to  10  (fully  confident  knowledge 
ascription).
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knowledge, or else they would do so in the Control condition too. 
Repeatedly  asking  about  the  truth  of  the  relevant  proposition 
doesn’t lead participants to deny knowledge, or else they would do 
so in the Control condition too.
One  final  thought  is  that  switching  the  contrast  from  ‘only 
thinks’ or ‘only believes’, as in the previous studies discussed in sec­
tion 3, to ‘only thinks he knows’ might have had an effect. I ran a 
follow­up study to test the conjecture. Participants (N = 21)15 in the 
Only Believes Gettier condition received the same story and ques­
tions as the Authentic Gettier condition, except for one difference: 
for the key test question, ‘really knows’ was contrasted with the ori­
ginal  ‘only believes’  instead.  But the results  didn’t  differ  signific­
antly from Authentic Gettier: 81% selected ‘only believes’ (Fisher’s, 
p = 0.683), and the mean weighted knowledge ascription was ­5.71 
(F(1,46) = .171, p = 0.682). (See Figure 1.) 16
Figure 1: Lef Panel: percentage of participants atributing knowledge. Right Panel: 
mean weighted knowledge ascription (derived by multiplying the dichotomous an­
15 Ten female, aged 18–53, M = 30.9, SD = 10.8. Ninety­six percent reported 
English as their native language. I excluded data from nine participants 
who failed comprehension questions.
16 For those worried that  Control  doesn’t  closely  enough match Authentic 
Gettier, see section 9.
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swer by reported confidence).
5. Zebra and mule
If  I’m  right  that  the  conspicuous  tripartite  structure  effectively 
guides laypeople, then participants will respond similarly to other 
Gettier cases presented that way, even when the cover story is very 
different.17 For example, it shouldn’t matter whether the protagonist 
forms a belief about an artifact such as a coin, or an animal such as 
a zebra. This section reports an experiment that tests this predic­
tion.
5.1. Method
Participants (N  = 24)18 in the Zebra condition read the following 
story.
Stage One: Zach has an appointment with his lawyer in an 
office building in New York City. As he enters the lobby on 
the first floor, he sees something highly unexpected: a large 
animal  with  black  and  white  stripes  under  a  banner  that 
says, "Pet a zebra for children's charity." In exchange for a 
$10 donation to a local children's charity, you get to pet this 
17 Here I set aside cover stories that might trigger ‘the epistemic side­effect 
effect’  (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010, Buckwalter forthcoming,  Beebe and 
Shea ms.; see also Turri 2012a). Pilot data from work in progress suggest 
that the present approach inhibits the epistemic side­effect. But respons­
ibly addressing this issue requires more time and space than I can devote 
to it here. 
18 Seven female, aged 18–54, M = 28.42, SD = 10. Ninety­five percent repor­
ted English as their native language. I excluded data from six participants 
who failed comprehension questions.
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illustrious  animal.  Zach  quickly  walks  up the  stairs  to  his 
lawyer's office on the second floor. He greets the receptionist 
and says, "Guess what? There is a zebra down on the first 
floor of the building."
Stage Two: The people running the charity could not afford 
to  rent  a  real  zebra  for  the  charity  drive.  So  instead  they 
hired an artist to paint black and white stripes on a mule. 
The animal Zach saw in the first­floor lobby was actually a 
cleverly disguised mule. It looks just like a zebra, but it isn't. 
It's a mule.
Stage Three: The office building that Zach is in is very large. 
One of the companies renting space in the building is in the 
business of importing exotic animals. It is illegal for them to 
keep these animals in an office building, but they do it any­
way. They recently acquired a zebra and are keeping it well­
hidden in a locked, sound­proof room on the first floor of the 
building.
At the end of each stage, participants were asked a single compre­
hension question:
When Zach greets the receptionist,  is there a zebra on the 
first floor of the building? [Yes/No].
Then they were asked the test question:
When Zach greets the receptionist, he _______ that there is 
a zebra on the first floor of the building. [really knows/only 
thinks he knows.]
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Participants were asked to report how confident they were about 
their answer to the test question (1–10, low to high). As before, each 
stage was presented on a different screen. Participants couldn’t go 
back and change answers.
5.1.1. Results and discussion
I  predicted  that  participants  in  Zebra  would  overwhelmingly  re­
spond that Zach ‘only thinks he knows’. The prediction was true: 
100% of participants answered that Zach ‘only thinks he knows’.19 
This supports my proposal that the conspicuous tripartite structure 
effectively guides participants.
6. Burglar and husband
If  I’m  right  that  the  conspicuous  tripartite  structure  effectively 
guides participants,  then we should be able to take Gettier  cases 
from previous experiments and transform them so that participants 
deny that the Gettier subject knows. For example, consider the ori­
ginal case involving Katie (section 3), in response to which parti­
cipants tend to ascribe knowledge. We should be able to take that 
case and transform it stepwise in order to effectively guide parti­
cipants, whereupon they will tend to deny knowledge. This section 
reports an experiment designed to test this prediction.
6.1.1. Method
Participants (N = 46)20 were randomly assigned to one of two condi­
19 Even  including  the  participants  who  failed  a  comprehension  question, 
100% responded this way.
20 Thirteen female, aged 18–59, M = 27.33, SD = 8.39. One hundred percent 
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tions: Burglar and Husband. The stories for these conditions were 
based on Starmans and Friedman’s story involving Katie. The stor­
ies shared the  first  and  second stages in common, but differed in 
the third stage. Here are the stories, with the different third stages 
clearly marked.
Stage One: Katie is in the living room of her locked apart­
ment writing a letter with a blue Bic pen. She puts the letter 
and the blue Bic pen down on her coffee table. Then she goes 
into  the  bathroom  to  take  a  shower.  It  takes  her  fifteen 
minutes to finish.
Stage Two: Just after Katie started her shower, two burglars, 
a master and his apprentice, broke into her apartment. As 
they made their way around the apartment, the master burg­
lar stole Katie's blue Bic pen from the coffee table. After five 
minutes,  the  burglars  left,  well  before  Katie  finished  her 
shower. Katie did not hear anything.
Stage Three – Burglar: Right before the burglars left Katie's 
apartment, the apprentice burglar started feeling a bit dizzy, 
so he sat down on the couch for a moment to recover. When 
the apprentice burglar sat down, he absentmindedly set his 
own blue Bic pen on the coffee table, and forgot it there. This 
was five minutes before Katie finished her shower.
Stage Three – Husband: Right after the burglars left, Katie's 
reported English as their native language. I excluded data from thirteen 
participants who failed comprehension questions.
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husband came home. Tired from a long journey, he put his 
wallet,  keys and his own blue Bic pen down on the coffee 
table in the living room. Then he immediately lay down on 
the living room couch and fell asleep. This was five minutes 
before  Katie  finished  her  shower.  Katie  hasn't  yet  noticed 
that her husband is even home.
The comprehension question asked at the end of each stage was:
As Katie is in the bathroom finishing her shower, is there a 
blue Bic pen on her coffee table? [Yes/No]
The test question at the end was:
As  Katie  is  in  the  bathroom  finishing  her  shower,  she 
_______ that there is a blue Bic pen on her coffee table. 
[really knows/only thinks she knows]
Participants  were  then  asked  to  report  how confident  they  were 
about their answer to the test question (1–10, low to high). Each 
stage was presented on a different screen. Participants couldn’t go 
back and change answers. 
The earlier replication of Starmans and Friedman’s study (sec­
tion 3), which used the original case of Katie, served as the Control 
for this experiment.
6.1.2. Results and discussion
The materials for Burglar and Husband are adapted from the ori­
ginal case of Katie. The goal is to see whether incrementally modify­
ing it to fit the conspicuous tripartite structure will result in a cor­
responding decrease in knowledge attributions.
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Katie’s original story was presented all at once, and the nondes­
cript pair of burglars was the source of both the bad and good luck: 
one burglar took a blue Bic pen, while the other left a pen that ef­
fectively replaced it. The story for Burglar is substantially similar, 
except that it  is rewritten to occur in three stages and to achieve 
some  separation  between  the  two  burglars:  the  master  burglar 
steals the pen, while the apprentice burglar leaves one that effect­
ively replaces it. Still, the burglars operate as a team, so the separa­
tion between the source of bad and good luck could be more con­
spicuous. The story for Husband achieves much clearer separation 
between the source of bad and good luck: the burglars steal the pen, 
but this time Katie’s husband, who has nothing to do with the burg­
lars, replaces it. All things considered, the story for Husband best 
fits the conspicuous tripartite  structure,  Control  least  well  fits  it, 
and Burglar falls somewhere in between.
Accordingly, I made three predictions. First, Control would see 
the highest rates of knowledge ascription, followed by Burglar, then 
Husband. Second, although I wasn’t sure whether response rates in 
Burglar would differ significantly from those in Control, I predicted 
that response rates in Husband would. Third, I predicted that parti­
cipants in Husband would select ‘only thinks she knows’  at  rates 
greater  than chance.  Finally,  I  predicted that  rates  of  knowledge 
ascription in Husband wouldn’t differ significantly from those ob­
served in Authentic Gettier (section 4).
The predictions were all true. First, the relative rates of know­
ledge  ascription  were  Control  57%,  Burglar  44%,  and  Husband 
21  |  Putting Gettier to the test
24%.  Second,  rates  of  knowledge ascription in  Husband differed 
significantly from Control (Fisher’s p = 0.04). Third, participants in 
Husband  selected  ‘only  thinks  she  knows’  at  rates  greater  than 
chance  (76%,  binomial,  p  =  0.028).  Finally,  rates  of  knowledge 
ascription in Husband didn’t differ significantly from those in Au­
thentic Gettier, for either the dichotomous (Fisher’s,  p = 0.272) or 
weighted  ascription  (F(1,46)  =  .983,  p  =  0.327).  These  results 
provide further support for the effectiveness of conspicuous tri­par­
titioning.
7. Subcontinental drift
As mentioned earlier, previous results suggested that people from 
the Subcontinent (‘SCs’) tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier sub­
jects  (Weinberg,  Nichols and Stich 2001).  If  the conspicuous tri­
partite structure effectively guides participants, then it should do so 
whether  the  participants  are  from  North  America  or  the  Indian 
Subcontinent.  This  section  reports  an  experiment  that  tests  this 
prediction.
7.1. Method
Participants (N = 27)21 in the SC Tripartite condition were recruited 
21 Ten female, aged 20–60, M = 33.6, SD = 13.05. Participants listed the fol­
lowing native languages (with three listing two native languages): English 
(44%), Tamil (30%), Hindi (18.5%), Malayalam (15%), Marathi (3.7%). I 
excluded data from fifty­four participants who failed comprehension ques­
tions.  With  three  dichotomous  comprehension  questions,  each  with  a 
unique correct answer, 27 (33.3%) is also almost three times as many as 
would be expected by chance to pass all three checks (≈10, or 12.5%), which 
is significant (binomial, p<.001, one­tailed). Whether a participant failed a 
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using Amazon Mechanical Turk and located throughout India, the 
heart of the Subcontinent. They read a story similar to the one from 
Authentic Gettier, except that it had a different second stage:
Stage Two – SC Gettier: What Robert doesn't realize is that 
the coin dealer cheated him. The coin Robert brought home 
from the coin shop, and which is currently on display in his 
library, is a very convincing forgery. It's not a real 1804 US 
silver dollar. Robert isn't aware of this as he greets his guests 
and tells them, "There is an 1804 US silver dollar in my lib­
rary."
Participants in SC Tripartite were questioned in exactly the same 
way as participants in Authentic Gettier.
7.2.Results and discussion
I made two predictions. First, participants in SC Tripartite would 
ascribe knowledge at rates significantly lower than Weinberg, Nich­
ols  and Stich observed in their  original  study (hereafter ‘SC Ori­
ginal’). Second, response rates in SC Tripartite would not differ sig­
nificantly from those observed in Authentic Gettier.
Both predictions  were  true.  First,  only  15% said  that  Robert 
comprehension question was correlated with whether they ascribed know­
ledge  (r =  ­.278,  N = 81,  p =  0.012). Overall, 42.6% of participants who 
failed at least one comprehension question ascribed knowledge, compared 
to only 14.8% of participants who passed all comprehension questions. And 
67% of all participants,  including those who failed comprehension ques­
tions, said that Robert ‘only thinks he knows’, which far exceeds what could 
be  expected  by chance  (binomial,  p  =  0.016);  and  only  33% said  that 
Robert ‘really knows’, which differs significantly from what was observed in 
SC Original (61%, binomial, p < 0.001).
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‘really knows’, which differs significantly from SC Original (61%, bi­
nomial, p < .001). Second, response rates didn’t differ significantly 
from Authentic  Gettier  for  either  the dichotomous (15% ascribed 
knowledge, Fisher’s,  p  = 1) or the weighted knowledge ascription 
(M = ­5.89, SD = 6.14, F(1,52) = .117, p = 0.734).
I grant that surveys conducted in participants’ native languages 
on the Subcontinent would be preferable. Nevertheless, this survey 
was conducted in an official language of India,  English,  which is 
used extensively in commerce and public administration. Moreover, 
the results fit what was predicted and resemble the results observed 
in  other  studies  reported  above.  Accordingly  —  and  bearing  in 
mind, of course, that we shouldn’t draw any firm conclusions based 
on a single study of this size — these results should lead us to recon­
sider earlier  claims that  the Gettier  intuition isn’t  shared on the 
Subcontinent. This is certainly fitting because in the Indo­Tibetan 
philosophical tradition, Gettier­style cases were discussed along the 
banks of  the Ganges well  over  a  thousand years before  Edmund 
Gettier published his paper from the banks of the Detroit River.22
8. A persistent pattern
A persistent pattern has emerged (Figure 2). Response rates across 
the five Gettier conditions with conspicuous tripartite structures did 
not differ significantly for either the dichotomous (χ2(4) = 6.447, p 
= 0.168) or the weighted knowledge ascription (F(4,115) = 1.48, p = 
22 See Matilal 1986: 135–7 and Stoltz 2007: 298. Stoltz doesn’t think these are 
technically Gettier cases.
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0.231). This is exactly what we would expect if the conspicuous tri­
partite structure effectively guides participants.
Figure 2: Comparison of the percentage of participants who ascribed knowledge 
across the five Getier conditions thus far, alongside the Control (section 4).
Across all five Gettier conditions, gender had no effect on rates 
of dichotomous (13.5/13%, Fisher’s,  p = 1) or weighted knowledge 
ascriptions  (M  =  ­6.46/­6,  SD  =  6.05/5.74,  F(1,118)  =  .17,  p  = 
0.681). Age had no effect on rates of dichotomous (χ2(1) = .288, p = 
0.789) or weighted knowledge ascriptions either (F(1,118) = .693, p 
= 0.407).
9. Partition and source
Getting participants to appreciate distinct strokes of luck is easier 
when the strokes emanate from conspicuously distinct sources. The 
stories I have used dramatize this separation by having the second 
stage focus on the bad luck,  while the third stage focuses on the 
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good luck. In Husband (section 6), a thief was the source of bad 
luck, and the husband was the source of good luck. In Authentic 
Gettier (section 4), a thief was the source of bad luck, and a car­
penter’s mishap hundreds of years ago was the source of good luck.
But one might object that by introducing a different source of 
luck in, say, the second stage of Authentic Gettier as compared to 
Control, or by switching the source of good luck in Husband from 
the thieves to the husband,  I  have introduced elements that are, 
strictly speaking, unnecessary for Gettierization.23 And other differ­
ences  inevitably  creep in  as  a  result  of  changing  sources.  These 
changes arguably go beyond the minimal change needed to turn a 
case of knowledge into a Gettier case. More to the point, they might 
go beyond the minimal change needed to turn what laypeople judge 
is a case of knowledge into what laypeople can be counted on to re­
cognize as a case involving Gettierization.
This objection leaves me ambivalent. On the one hand, abso­
lutely minimally matched pairs are always good if you can get them. 
The more minimally matched the pair, the more persuasive the ex­
periment, if the results turn out as predicted. On the other hand, 
I’m not persuaded that there is such a thing as a minimal necessary 
change to turn a case of knowledge into a Gettier case. But more to 
the point in the present context, even granting that there is such a 
thing  as  minimal  Gettierization,  it’s  an  open  question  whether 
laypeople can be counted on to recognize it, and thus it’s an open 
question  what  sort  of  guidance  they  need  to  competently  assess 
23 Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman helpfully put this objection to me.
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such a case. Nevertheless, that doesn’t mean that we can’t do better 
than what I’ve done thus far.
Suppose that laypeople routinely deny knowledge at significant 
rates in a wide range of non­minimal Gettier cases, yet they tend to 
ascribe knowledge in minimal Gettier cases.24 Furthermore suppose 
that  no plausible theoretical  basis  can be  found to treat  the  two 
sorts of case differently, and that all the professionals think that the 
two sorts  of  case  are  clearly  not  examples  of  knowledge.  To my 
mind,  at  that  point  the  most  plausible  conclusion would be  that 
laypeople can’t be counted on to competently enough assess min­
imal Gettier cases. Their failure would reveal something interesting 
about how people ordinarily think of knowledge, and it would be 
very interesting to learn why they fail. But their failure would have 
no significant implication for a theory of knowledge.
But it might not come to that. This section reports an experi­
ment designed to test whether the tripartite structure can effectively 
guide participants  to  assess Gettier  cases that are more minimal 
than the ones used earlier.
9.1. Method
Participants (N=149)25 were randomly assigned to one of five condi­
tions: No Luck, Bad Luck, Good Luck, 1­Gettier (one­stage Gettier), 
and 3­Gettier (three­stage Gettier).  The stories for the conditions 
24 I’m merely granting this for the sake of argument at this point. Below I ar­
gue that laypeople will deny knowledge in even minimal Gettier cases.
25 Sixty­four female, aged 18–71, M = 31.8, SD = 11.9. Ninety­nine percent lis­
ted English as their native language. I eliminated data from twenty­six par­
ticipants who failed comprehension questions.
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were built up from narrative modules. Table 1 shows how they were 
built, along with the questions used. Here are the modules (parti­
cipants did not see the labels):
(No Luck) Grace is alone in the living room of her locked 
apartment, writing a letter with a blue Bic pen. She puts the 
letter and the blue Bic pen down on her coffee table and goes 
into the bathroom to take a quick shower. While she is in the 
shower, the apartment remains locked and nobody enters.
(Traffic) Just as Grace began her shower, several construc­
tion vehicles drove by her apartment building. Because Grace 
was in the shower, she didn't notice the traffic.
(Bad Luck) But the vibrations from the construction traffic 
caused something to happen [caused two things to happen]: 
¶26 [First,] The vibrations caused the blue Bic pen, which she 
had set down, to shift position, fall off the coffee table, and 
land on the floor. Because Grace was still in the shower, she 
didn't notice that this happened.
(Good  Luck)  [[But]  The  vibrations  from  the  construction 
traffic caused something [else] to happen:] ¶ [Second,] For a 
very long time, there has been a blue Bic pen hidden in the 
light  fixture  in  Grace's  living room,  right  above the  coffee 
table. No one, not even Grace, has ever noticed this hidden 
pen. The vibrations caused this hidden blue Bic pen to fall 
down and land on the coffee table. Because Grace was still in 
26 Indicates paragraph break on the participant’s screen.
John Turri  |  28
the shower, she did not notice that this happened.
The comprehension questions were:
(CQ1) Right before Grace finishes her shower, she thinks that 
there is a blue Bic pen on the coffee table because _______. 
[she put one there/one fell from the ceiling]
(CQ2) Right before Grace finishes her shower, it is _______ 
for her to think that there is a blue Bic pen on the coffee 
table. [reasonable/unreasonable]
(CQ3) Right before Grace finishes her shower, is there a blue 
Bic pen on the coffee table? [Yes/No]
The test question was a dichotomous knowledge choice, followed by 
a confidence measure (1–10, low to high):
(KQ) Right before Grace finishes her shower, she _______ 
that  there  is  a  blue  Bic  pen  on  the  coffee  table.  [really 
knows/only thinks she knows]
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Table 1: List of modules composing the storylines, along with the questions, across 
the five conditions. Dashed lines mark page breaks.




































Participants in 3­Gettier were asked two more questions than 
participants in other conditions were,27 but as explained earlier 
(section 2), this is part of the tri­partitioning treatment. I sparingly 
made minor grammatical and narrative adjustments to ensure that 
the modules fit together smoothly in the different conditions (indi­
cated by bracketed material above). For example, in 1­Gettier, in­
stead of twice writing, ‘But the vibrations from the construction 
traffic caused something to happen,’ I once wrote, ‘But the vibra­
tions from the construction traffic caused two things to happen,’ 
and then used ordinal introductory elements (‘First’ and ‘Second’) 
to begin the next two paragraphs. And in 3­Gettier, the storyline 
was more intelligible by including the Traffic module after the first 
page break.
27 They answered CQ3 at the end of each stage, for a total of three times, com ­
pared to just once for participants in other conditions.
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9.2.Results and discussion
Only one source  of  luck appears  in  the  storyline  — construction 
traffic — and is responsible for both the bad luck and the good luck. 
No other agent enters the scene:  neither thief,  nor husband, nor 
even so much as a mouse or housefly. In the Good Luck module, the 
previously hidden pen falls right on to the coffee table, and so is just 
as noticeable as the original pen. In the Bad Luck module, the pen 
that Grace set down merely falls on to the floor and is not described 
as hidden or otherwise concealed from view. The modular design 
allows us to compare how participants are affected by adding bad 
luck only, good luck only, as well as bad and good luck together. 
Moreover,  it  allows us to directly  compare responses to unparti­
tioned versus partitioned versions of the exact same storyline.
Grace is arguably a more minimal Gettier subject than Katie is. 
Katie is victimized, but Grace isn’t. The source of luck in Grace’s 
story is impersonal and benign,  but the source of luck in Katie’s 
story is personal and malign (a pair of agents invade her home and 
rob her).  Moreover,  the source of  luck in Grace’s story is clearly 
unitary, whereas in Katie’s story it’s at least notionally binary.28 On 
each comparison, Katie’s story introduces complexities inessential 
to Gettierization: victimization, agency, malignancy, and a notion­
ally binary source of luck. Grace’s story is a more minimal Gettier 
case. If the tripartite method succeeds here, then it will have passed 
its most grueling test.
28 I say ‘at least notionally’ because, as mentioned in section 6, the thieves are 
nondescript and act as a team.
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I made eight predictions about the results. Knowledge ascrip­
tion in No Luck would be very high, because it involves a normal 
case of indirect knowledge of a mundane matter of fact.  Second, 
knowledge ascription in Bad Luck would be at  floor, because the 
unexpected bad luck results in a false belief, whereas knowledge re­
quires truth. Third, knowledge ascription in Good Luck would be 
high, and probably no different from No Luck. A bit of good luck 
that installs a “back­up” truth­maker, and nothing more, shouldn’t 
hinder  knowledge  ascription.  Fourth,  knowledge  ascription  in  1­
Gettier would not differ significantly from chance, in line with my 
earlier replication of Starmans and Friedman’s case of Katie (sec­
tion 4). Fifth, knowledge ascription in 1­Gettier would differ signi­
ficantly  from  No  Luck.  Sixth,  knowledge  ascription  in  3­Gettier 
would occur at rates significantly less than chance. Seventh, know­
ledge ascription in 3­Gettier would not differ significantly from Bad 
Luck. That is, tri­partitioned Gettierization will inhibit knowledge 
ascription at rates similar to falsehood. Finally, in light of all that, I 
predicted the  following relative  ordering of  knowledge­ascription 
rates across the conditions (low to high): Bad Luck < 3­Gettier < 1­
Gettier < Good Luck < No Luck.
All eight predictions were true. First, knowledge ascription in 
No Luck was very high (81%) and beyond what could be expected by 
chance (binomial, p = 0.001). Second, knowledge ascription in Bad 
Luck  was  very  low (16%)  and  below what  could be  expected  by 
chance (binomial, p < 0.001). Third, knowledge ascription in Good 
Luck was high (76%), greater than could be expected by chance (bi­
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nomial,  p = 0.016), and it didn’t differ significantly from No Luck 
(Fisher’s,  p  =  0.758).  Fourth,  knowledge  ascription  in  1­Gettier 
didn’t differ significantly from chance (48%, binomial,  p  = 1) and 
was actually lower than I expected. Fifth, knowledge ascription in 1­
Gettier differed significantly from No Luck (Fisher’s,  p  = 0.018).29 
Sixth, knowledge ascription in 3­Gettier occurred at rates signific­
antly less than chance (29%, binomial, p = 0.018). Seventh, know­
ledge  ascription  in  3­Gettier  didn’t  differ  significantly  from  Bad 
Luck (Fisher’s, p = 0.347).30 Finally, the relative ordering of know­
ledge ascription rates was as predicted (Figure 3).
Results from the weighted knowledge ascription tell a similar 
story.  Mean weighted knowledge ascription in No Luck was high 
and beyond what could be expected by chance (M = 5.55, SD = 7.05, 
t(30) = 4.38,  p  <  0.001). In Bad Luck it was low and below what 
could be expected by chance (M = ­6.03, SD = 6.84, t(31) = ­4.99, p 
< 0.001). In Good Luck it was high, beyond what could be expected 
by chance (M = 5, SD = 7.5, t(28) = 3.6, p < 0.001), and it didn’t dif­
fer significantly from No Luck (t(28) = ­.39, p = 0.697). In 1­Gettier 
it didn’t differ significantly from chance (M = .31, SD = 8.6, t(28) = 
0.195,  p = 0.847)  but differed significantly from No Luck (t(28) = 
­3.3, p = 0.003). In 3­Gettier it was low, below what could be expec­
29 It did not differ from 3­Gettier (Fisher’s, p = 0.208). Given that knowledge 
ascription in Husband and Burglar didn’t differ significantly, I didn’t pre­
dict that it would differ significantly between 1­Gettier and 3­Gettier either.
30 Rates of knowledge ascription in 3­Gettier, an authentic­evidence Gettier 
case, differed significantly from Zebra, an apparent­evidence Gettier case 
from section 5 (100%, binomial,  p < 0.001). This supports Starmans and 
Friedman’s point that laypeople are sensitive to the distinction and that it 
significantly affects rates of knowledge ascription.
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ted by chance (M = ­3.72, SD = 7.6, t(27) = ­2.583, p < 0.008), and 
it didn’t differ significantly from Bad Luck (t(27) = 1.6,  p = 0.119). 
Finally, the relative ordering of mean weighted knowledge ascrip­
tions across the conditions was the same as for dichotomous know­
ledge ascriptions (Figure 3).
As  an  added  bonus,  even  though  dichotomous  knowledge 
ascription rates in 3­Gettier didn’t differ from 1­Gettier (Fisher’s, p 
=  0.104, one­tailed), weighted knowledge ascriptions did (t(27) = 
­2.8, p = 0.018, one­tailed).
Figure  3 summarizes the results from this experiment, which 
further support my proposal that tripartitioning effectively guides 
laypeople to assess Gettier cases.
Figure  3:  Lef Panel:  percentage of participants atributing knowledge  in the five 
conditions. Right Panel: mean weighted knowledge ascription (derived by multiply­
ing the dichotomous answer by reported confidence).
A couple other features of these results deserve mention. First, 
some might find the rate of knowledge attribution in Bad Luck sur­
prisingly high, given that it was a clear case of false belief. One in six 
participants said  that  a  false  belief  was real  knowledge.  But  this 
John Turri  |  34
doesn’t  differ  significantly  from  what  other  researchers  have 
found,31 so it seems that a small but persistent minority of people 
use ‘really knows’ non­factively. Second, some might find the rate of 
knowledge attribution in No Luck and Good Luck surprisingly low, 
given that the pen had only been out of Grace’s sight for a very short 
time,  and she is  alone in  a  secure,  locked apartment.  Overall  in 
these two conditions (N = 60), 78.3% ascribed knowledge. Although 
this far exceeds what could be expected by chance (binomial,  p < 
0.001) and doesn’t differ significantly from what was observed in 
Control from section 4 (84%, binomial,  p  =  0.153), it’s still note­
worthy  that  roughly  one  in  six  participants  think  that  we  don’t 
really know such routine facts based on memory and inference. Put­
ting the two observations together, roughly equal numbers of parti­
cipants ascribe knowledge in ways that diverge significantly from 
what mainstream epistemological theories say is the true verdict: 
one­sixth ascribe knowledge too liberally, endorsing non­factive ap­
plications,32 and  one­sixth  ascribe  knowledge  too  conservatively, 
endorsing skeptical abstentions.
10. Conclusion
I  conclude  that  the  conspicuous  tripartite  structure  effectively 
guides laypeople to competently assess Gettier cases. When probed 
this way, laypeople across very different cultures, male and female, 
31 Starmans and Friedman (2012) report  ~10% ascribing knowledge in their 
false belief controls, and Buckwalter (ms.) reports a similar consistent pat­
tern of participants using ‘knows’ non­factively.
32 Here I’m setting aside knowledge ascriptions to Gettier subjects.
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young and old, reveal that they overwhelmingly share the Gettier 
intuition.
Further research could investigate whether any factors mediate 
tripartitioning’s  effect  on  participant  response.  For  example,  it’s 
possible that tripartitioning works primarily because it causes parti­
cipants to be more reflective. Relatedly, further research could in­
vestigate  whether  dual­process  psychology  (Stanovich  and  West 
2000) explains the difference between judgments in tripartitioned 
and  non­tripartitioned  conditions.  Perhaps  the  automatic,  unre­
flective  application of  our  concept  of  knowledge (“System 1  pro­
cessing”) classifies Gettier cases as knowledge, and it is only when 
distinct, reflective psychological capacities are triggered (“System 2 
processing”)  that  participants  tend  to  deny  knowledge  in  such 
cases. If this dual­process conjecture turns out to be true, then even 
though the Gettier intuition is  readily shared, it isn’t  immediately 
shared. And this would be a very important fact about how we or­
dinarily think about knowledge.33
33 For helpful feedback and conversations that helped to greatly improve this 
paper, I’m happy to thank Joshua Alexander, James Beebe, Peter Blouw, 
Wesley  Buckwalter,  Frank Jackson,  Joshua Knobe,  Ernie Sosa,  Chandra 
Sripada, Angelo Turri, Jonathan Weinberg, Linda Zagzebski, four (!) astute 
and encouraging anonymous referees for Philosophers’ Imprint, numerous 
family members and friends who patiently indulged me by acting as volun­
teer test subjects at various meals and gatherings, and those who particip­
ated in a discussion of an earlier draft of this paper on the blog  Experi­
mental Philosophy. Special thanks go to Ori Friedman, Jonathan Schaffer 
and Christina Starmans. This research was kindly supported by the Social 
Sciences  and  Humanities  Research  Council  of  Canada,  the  British 
Academy, the Association of Commonwealth Universities, the National En­
dowment for the Humanities, The Character Project at Wake Forest Uni­
versity and the John Templeton Foundation (neither of which necessarily 
endorses any opinion expressed here),  and an Ontario Early Researcher 
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